Abstract-We consider the problem of stealth communication over a multipath network in the presence of an active adversary. The multipath network consists of multiple parallel noiseless links, and the adversary is able to eavesdrop and jam a subset of links. We consider two types of jamming -erasure jamming and overwrite jamming. We require the communication to be both stealthy and reliable, i.e., the adversary should be unable to detect whether or not meaningful communication is taking place, while the legitimate receiver should reconstruct any potential messages from the transmitter with high probability simultaneously. We provide inner bounds on the robust stealth capacities under both adversarial erasure and adversarial overwrite jamming.
1 It is impossible to communicate stealthily and reliably when Z ≥ C/2, since James can always "symmetrize" -send a fake message pretending to be Alice (and using her codebook) on the (at least) half of the links he controls. 2 The square-root law states that one can only transmit O( √ n) bits covertly and reliably over n channel uses. the channel from Alice to James is not known a priori to Alice and Bob because of James' flexibility in choosing which subset of Z links to sit on, as opposed to a fixed channel from Alice to James in most relevant work (other than [2] , [7] ).
Instead of the broadly studied random noise channels, the work [8] (on covert communication) shifts the focus to the adversarial noise channels, i.e., the channel between Alice and Bob can be maliciously jammed by James, and the coding scheme there should be resilient to every possible (including even the worst) jamming strategy induced by James. This work inherits the eavesdrop-and-jam framework studied in [8] . In both scenarios, the jammer may cleverly design its jamming strategy based on his observations to disturb any potential communication. Without the stealth/covertness constraint, the eavesdrop-and-jam framework has been investigated in myopic adversarial channels [9] , correlated jamming channels [10] , and multipath networks [11] . Furthermore, we point out that the functionalities of the jammer in this work is fundamentally different from [12] , wherein the jammer is present to help Alice and Bob by sending "artificial noise" to the eavesdropper (similar to the cooperative jamming [13] for security problem).
Reliable communication (without the stealth constraint) over a multipath network in the presence of a jammer has been well-studied in the past. The work [14] shows that as long as Z < C/2, Alice and Bob can fully utilize the rest of links to communicate, regardless of the types of jamming (either erasure or overwrite). Robustness against erasure jamming is relatively straightforward while robustness against overwrite jamming requires non-trivial coding schemes (such as pairwise hashing [14] ). Similar results are obtained in this work while also taking stealth into account.
B. Our Contributions and High-level Intuition
This work builds upon [2] by considering an active malicious adversary, who can maliciously disturb the transmission. The best rate one can hope for is in general smaller than in [2] , since the links being controlled do not carry information anymore (under erasure jamming), or may even carry misleading information (under overwrite jamming).
Firstly, we provide an inner bound on the robust stealth capacity under erasure jamming. The channel between Alice and James can be viewed as an aggregation of all the links controlled by James, while the channel between Alice and Bob can be viewed as an aggregation of the complement of these links (since James erases everything on the links he controls). The stealth constraint imposes a lower bound on the rate (as a consequence of the channel resolvability [4] ), while the reliability constraint imposes an upper bound. Moreover, as is standard in wiretap secrecy problems, creating an artificial noisy channel at the encoder (or equivalently, adding an auxiliary random variable) may hurt James more than Bob, and in turn lead to a higher throughput.
Coding against an overwrite jammer is significantly more non-trivial since all possible jamming strategies should be considered. In this work we prove that there still exists a robust coding scheme allowing communicating stealthily and reliably. The crux of our proof is to take advantage of James' uncertainty about the message/codeword conditioned on his observations. This is inspired by the novel ideas in [9] for reliable communication over myopic adversarial channels. From a stealth perspective, the major challenge in this work is to design communication schemes that introduce redundancy across the C links (so as to enable resilience to James' jamming) without allowing the resulting correlation across links to reveal to James that Alice is actually communicating.
While the focus of this work is on robustness to active jamming, it has not escaped our attention that composing our schemes with well-known techniques in the informationtheoretic literature allows us to get schemes that are secure against both information leakage and active jamming attacks in this stealth communication setting. A full characterization of this communication setting with trifold objectives is a source of ongoing investigation.
II. MODEL
Random variables and their realizations are respectively denoted by uppercase letters and lowercase letters, e.g., X and x. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g., X . Vectors of length-n are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., X and x. If the single-letter distribution on X is P X , then the corresponding n-letter product distribution n i=1 P X is denoted by P X . The multipath network consists of C parallel links L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L C , each link L i carries a symbol from the alphabet X i per time instant. The alphabet for all the links taken together is denoted by X = C i=1 X i . Alice's transmission status is denoted by T ∈ {0, 1} -T = 0 if Alice is innocent, whereas T = 1 if Alice is active. The message M is either 0 (if Alice is innocent) or uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , N } (if Alice is active). Note that no prior distribution is assigned to T and only Alice knows T and M a priori. Let n be the blocklength (number of time instants). The length-n vector transmitted on the j-th link is denoted by x j , and the collection of vectors on C links is denoted by
T . Note that x can also be viewed as a length-n vector over X . The system diagram is illustrated in Figure 1 . Innocent distribution: When Alice is innocent (T = 0), at each time instant t (1 ≤ t ≤ n), an innocent transmission pattern on the C links is sampled according to the timeindependent innocent distribution P inn X ∈ P(X ), where P(X ) denotes the set of all distributions on X . For any subset
Over n time instants, the corresponding nletter innocent distribution (resp. n-letter marginal innocent distribution) is a product distribution with the form
Encoder: Alice's encoder Ψ(., .) takes the transmission status T and the message M as input, and outputs a length-n vector X. If T = 1 and message m is transmitted, the encoder Ψ(1, m) outputs the corresponding length-n codeword X(m). The codebook C is the collection of all codewords X(m), ∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, and the rate is defined as R (log N )/n. If T = 0 (hence M = 0), the encoder Ψ(0, 0) outputs an innocent vector X according to the innocent distribution. We assume that the codebook C is public, i.e., it is known to all parties, including the jammer. Active distribution: The active distribution, averaged over all the codewords X(m) in the codebook C, is denoted byP X . Similarly, for any subset J ⊆ {L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L C }, the marginal active distribution is denoted byP X J . James' estimation and jamming: James is able to control any subset of links of size at most Z, and let J be the class of all possible subsets of size at most Z. James selects a specific subset J ∈ J, which is unknown to both Alice and Bob a priori. On the basis of his observation X J and his knowledge about the codebook C, James estimates Alice's transmission status T , and also non-causally jams the subset J to prevent reliable communication irrespective of his estimation. Estimation: James' estimator Φ(.) outputs a single bitT = Φ(X J ) to estimate Alice's transmission status T . The stealth is measured by the hypothesis-testing metric. Let α(Φ) = Pr X (T = 1|T = 0) and β(Φ) = Pr M,X (T = 0|T = 1) respectively be the probability of false alarm and the probability of missed detection of an estimator Φ. Stealth communication requires that regardless of which estimator Φ is chosen, α(Φ) + β(Φ) should approach one asymptotically. 3 A classical result on hypothesis testing [15] shows that the optimal estimator Φ * satisfies α(Φ
| is the variational distance between the marginal active distribution and the marginal innocent distribution. Hence we say the communication is stealth if lim n→∞ V(P X J , P inn X J ) = 0. Jamming: James can also jam the subset J that he controls. Under erasure jamming, the transmission X J (on the subset J) is completely replaced by the erasure symbols '⊥', while under overwrite jamming, X J is replaced by a carefully designed Y J . In particular, James is able to choose the jamming vector Y J stochastically according to any conditional distribution P Y J |X J ,C , since he knows X J and the codebook. Note that Bob can easily figure out the subset J under erasure jamming due to the appearance of '⊥', while it is not the case under overwrite jamming. Bob reconstructs the messagê M by applying his decoding function Γ(.) to his observation. The probabilities of error under erasure and overwrite jamming are respectively defined as
Pr(M = M |T = t).
Achievable rate: A rate R is said to be achievable under erasure jamming (resp. achievable under overwrite jamming) if there exists an infinite sequence of codes (Ψ n , Γ n ) such that each code in the sequence has rate at least R, and ensures
III. MAIN RESULTS To facilitate the statement of our results, we first define an optimization problem (A), which includes an auxiliary random variable U , for a fixed innocent distribution P inn X and a nonnegative integer Z < C/2 as follows:
The optimal value of (A) is denoted byK(P inn X , Z). Consider another optimization (B) sup
and let the optimal value be K(P inn X , Z). It is worth noting that K(P inn X , Z) is always bounded from above bȳ K(P inn X , Z), since (A) is equivalent to (B) by restricting U = X. As is usual in wiretap secrecy problems, Theorem 1 below shows that a higher rateK(P inn X , Z) − is achieved by introducing an auxiliary variable U .
Theorem 1 (Erasure jamming). For any P inn X
and nonnegative integer Z < C/2, the rate R =K(P inn X , Z) − is achievable under erasure jamming for any small > 0.
Remark 1 (Cardinality Bound). Bounding the cardinality of the auxiliary variable U is possible. Following standard cardinality bound arguments (c.f. [16] ), given any feasible (U, X) in (A), there always exists a feasible (U , X) with |U | ≤ |X | + 2|J| − 1 that yields the same objective value.
Compared with erasure jamming, dealing with overwrite jamming is much more challenging due to the fact that James, knowing Alice's codebook, may attempt to "spoof" Alice's transmissions. Bob's decoder should be robust to any jamming strategy P Y J |X J ,C , including the one that maximizes his probability of decoding error. However, our next result shows that stealth communication is still possible.
Theorem 2 (Overwrite jamming). For any P inn X
and nonnegative integer Z < C/2, the rate R = K(P inn X , Z) − is achievable under overwrite jamming for any small > 0.
IV. PROOF SKETCHES OF THEOREMS 1 & 2 A. Erasure jamming (Theorem 1)
The optimal distributions in optimization (A) are denoted by P U and P X|U . Encoder: Let R = min J∈J I(U ; X J c ) − (for any small > 0). For each message m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, where N = 2 nR , the intermediate codeword u(m) is generated according to the n-letter distribution P U . To transmit m, Alice chooses u(m) and stochastically maps u(m) to x(m) with probability P X|U (x(m)|u(m)). The length-n codeword x(m) is transmitted over the multipath network. Decoder: Bob first determines the subset J (controlled by James) based on the erasure symbol '⊥', and then applies typicality decoding based on y J c . Note that y J c = x J c since the subset J c is not controlled by James. He decodes toT = 1 andM = m if there exists a unique m such that (u(m), y J c ) are jointly typical, whereasT = 0 andM = 0 if there does not exist any m such that (u(m), y J c ) are jointly typical. Analysis: To satisfy the stealth constraint, one should guarantee that no matter which subset J is controlled by James, the marginal active distributionP X J is indistinguishable from the marginal innocent distribution P inn X J . Note that
Equation (6) follows from the constraint in (1), which ensures that the stochastic process u P U · P X J |U simulated by the encoder Ψ is identical to the marginal innocent distribution P inn X J . The constraint in (2) ensures the size of the codebook to be large enough so that with high probability (w.h.p.) the active distributionP X J is sufficiently close to u P U · P X J |U -it turns out that R > I(U ; X J ) is sufficient, as noticed in [4] , from a channel resolvability perspective. To prove it, we first denote the typical set of X J by A X J , and the jointly typical set (resp. joint type class) of U with respect to a typical x J by A U x J (resp. T U x J ). Recall that proving stealth is equivalent to bounding the variational distance
where the approximation (a) is obtained by discarding negligible atypical events, (b) is obtained by dividing the typical set A U x J into typical type classes T U x J , and (c) follows since
which is exponentially large since
−nI(U ;X J ) and N > 2 nI(U ;X J ) . One can apply the Chernoff bound to show that with probability at least 1 − 2e
n over the code design (super-exponentially close to one),
where ε n → 0 as n → ∞. By substituting (9) for (7), and taking a union bound over exponentially many T U x J and x J , we prove that V(P
with high probability for some function f (·). A detailed proof can be found in [17] .
To guarantee reliability, we note that the effective channel between Alice and Bob is P X J c |U under erasure jamming, since Bob has access to Y J c = X J c noiselessly. Hence, random codes of rate R < min J∈J I(U ; X J c ) naturally ensure reliability. Finally, we point out that the above analysis holds for every possible subset J ∈ J that James may choose.
B. Overwrite jamming (Theorem 2)
We first highlight two challenges for reliable decoding under overwrite jamming: 1) In contrast to erasure jamming, it is not trivial for Bob to figure out which subset J ∈ J is controlled by James. In fact, our coding scheme described below requires Bob to try every possible choice of J. 2) Though James can only control set J, he is not "completely blind" for the complement set J c . This is because Alice is constrained to using a stealth codebook, and hence any set of Z links must have marginal distributions that look innocent. 4 The ability to overwrite X J , together with the partial knowledge about X J c , may make it possible for James to fool Bob.
Nonetheless, as shown in Theorem 2, it is still possible for Alice and Bob to communicate at a positive rate, and we sketch the proof as follows. Let P X be the optimal distribution in (B). Encoder: Let R = min J∈J H(X J c ) − (for any small > 0). For each message m, the codeword x(m) is generated according to the n-letter distribution P X . Alice encodes m to x(m), and transmits x(m) over the multipath network. The codebook C {x(m)} N m=1 . Decoder: Since Bob does not know the set J controlled by James a priori, he attempts to decode based on every possible choice ofĴ ∈ J and applies an erasure-like decoding on its corresponding decoding setĴ c . For a specificĴ, Bob outputs a message m to his list L if there is a unique m such that xĴ c (m) = yĴ c , where xĴ c (m) is the sub-codeword of x(m) on setĴ c . This procedure is repeated for everyĴ ∈ J. Bob decodes toT = 1 andM = m if the list L contains a unique message m, decodes toT = 0 andM = 0 if the list L is empty, and declares an error otherwise. Analysis: The proof for stealth is similar to that in Section IV-A, hence we focus on reliability only. Suppose Alice is active (T = 1) and the subset J is controlled by James. When Bob decodes according to the "correct" decoding set J c = J c , the transmitted message m ∈ L w.h.p., since J c is noiseless and the rate R < H(P X J c ). If Bob decodes according to any otherĴ c (Ĵ = J), we argue that w.h.p., no other message m = m falls into L. We now consider the worst case wherein J ⊆Ĵ c (the decoding setĴ c contains all the links controlled by James). The set of "good" links inĴ c is denoted by G Ĵ c \ J. James is able to replace x J with y J according to any distribution P Y J |X J ,C , and the probability of error with respect to setĴ c and P Y J |X J ,C is given as
where 1{(x G (m), y J ) ∈ C} = 1 if there exists a message m = m such that the sub-codewords of m on G and J equals x G (m) and y J respectively. Note that in (10) we only consider y J = x J , since when y J = x J , Bob's decoder outputs the true message m to the list L and no error occurs. By considering typical events only and gathering all messages with the same sub-codeword on J together, we approximate (10) by
Lemma 1. For any typical x J and y J = x J , with probability 1 − 2 −ω(n) over the code design (super-exponentially close to one), a randomly chosen code C satisfies
where ε n → 0 as n → ∞.
Lemma 1 is the crux of our proof. On expectation, the ratio between the numerator and the denominator in (12) is a decaying function of n. We use the Chernoff bound to concentrate |m : x J (m) = x J , since the generation of each codeword is independent. Concentrating the numerator is trickier because of the complicated dependencies among different codewords. Nonetheless, we are still able to apply the McDiarmid's inequality [18] to concentrate it by constructing a function with small Lipschitz coefficients. A detailed proof can be found in [17] .
We also need to take a union bound over exponentially many x J and y J . This implies no matter which x J is received and which y J is overwritten by James, the induced probability of error is always bounded from above by ε n , and thus one can bound (11) from above (w.h.p.) as ε n N x J ∈A X J y J =x J P (y J |x J , C) · m : x J (m) = x J ≤ ε n .
Finally, a union bound over allĴ ∈ J shows that w.h.p., there does not exist a fake message m = m falling into L, which in turn implies the list L contains a unique message m. When Alice is innocent (T = 0), a similar proof technique shows that L is empty with high probability.
Remark 2. It would be interesting to see if it is possible to modify the proof technique above to show that the ratē K(P inn X , Z) − is also achievable. The main challenge is to deal with the complicated joint typicality relationship among (u, y J , x G ), since we introduce an auxiliary variable U and use typicality decoding. We believe that the this proof strategy likely works and conjecture the following achievability. Conjecture 1. For any P inn X and non-negative integer Z < C/2, the rate R =K(P inn X , Z) − is also achievable under overwrite jamming for any small > 0.
